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Transparency After Carpenter
Hannah Bloch-Wehbat
In his lecture at Washburn University School of Law, Professor
Matthew Tokson observed that Carpenter continued, rather than altered, the
existing course of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Carpenter's
refinement of Fourth Amendment protection is contiguous with previous
decisions recognizing the potential privacy harm of new technologies. By
recognizing that the government may conduct a Fourth Amendment
"search" when it acquires particularly detailed, intrusive information from
the coffers of third parties, the Carpenter Court, according to Professor
Tokson, was attentive to the risk that the profusion of new technologies, and
the decreasing costs of criminal investigation, pose to individual privacy.1
Accordingly, Professor Tokson also concluded that courts applying
Carpenter will likely recognize this general sensitivity to privacy intrusion
and hold that a variety of new technologies-web history, pole cams, and
smart homes-are equally entitled to Fourth Amendment protection.
The central observation of this invited response to Professor Tokson's
lecture is twofold. First, I write to highlight the social, political, and
economic factors at play in the Carpenter decision. The Carpenter Court
recognized, in particular, that digital surveillance implicates the rights of
more than just criminal suspects: it poses unique and unappreciated threats
to public governance of policing. The decision, I argue, reflects
longstanding preoccupations in Fourth Amendment decisions with
protecting the "public"-particularly innocent third parties-from intrusive
and baseless investigations.2 In so doing, I situate Professor Tokson's piece
alongside other scholarship exploring how Fourth Amendment doctrine
protects a broader set of interests than simply those of the criminal
defendant or suspect.3
t Assistant Professor of Law, Drexel University Thomas R. Kline School of Law.
1. Matthew Tokson, The Next Wave of Fourth Amendment Challenges After Carpenter, 59
wASHBURN L.J. 1 (2020).
2. See Shima Baradaran, Rebalancing the Fourth Amendment, 102 GEO. L.J. 1 (2013).
3. See, e.g., David Gray, Collective Standing under the Fourth Amendment, 55 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 77 (2018); David Gray, A Collective Right to Be Secure from Unreasonable Tracking, 48 TEX.
TECH L. REV. 189 (2015); Jed Rubenfeld, The End of Privacy, 61 STAN. L. REV. 101, 119 (2008);
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The second contribution is to highlight some practical obstacles to
Carpenter's approach of constraining intrusive digital searches. By
subjecting (at least some of) those digital searches to the warrant
requirement, the Carpenter court promoted values of transparency and anti-
secrecy. Yet, digital search warrants are governed by a different set of rules
than physical ones. Those rules are far more protective of law enforcement
interests than their physical counterparts. A raft of secrecy-promoting
practices in the digital context helps to ensure that digital searches are not
subject to the same kinds of public scrutiny and debate as physical
surveillance. This distinction has proven enduring despite Carpenter's
suggestion that the formal physical/digital divide should not dispose of
constitutional questions. As a result, digital searches remain removed from
some of the methods of democratic oversight and scrutiny that the Court
may have intended to promote.
I. PRIVACY'S PUBLIC FACE
As Professor Tokson notes, in the decades preceding Carpenter, the
prevailing rule was that "a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy
in information he voluntarily turns over to third parties."' This rule held
regardless of whether the "third party" involved was an undercover
informant,5 a bank,6 a FedEx worker,7 a telephone company, or the open
sky.9 Although the rule was not mechanically applied-as Professor
Tokson points out, the Court made exceptions in cases concerning hospitals,
hotel rooms, and pervasive location trackinglo-its importance grew in
direct relation to the emergence of the digital economy." Indeed, the
Thomas P. Crocker, The Political Fourth Amendment, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 303, 337 (2010); Thomas
K. Clancy, What Value(s) Does the Fourth Amendment Serve?: The Fourth Amendment as a Collective
Right, 43 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 255, 277-78 (2010); see also Matthew Tokson, Knowledge and Fourth
Amendment Privacy, 111 Nw. U. L. REv. 139 (2016) (exploring how Fourth Amendment doctrine relies
on understandings of "societal" or "collective" knowledge).
4. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2216 (2018) (quoting Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S.
735, 743-44 (1979)).
5. Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966).
6. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
7. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (1984).
8. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
9. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986).
10. See Tokson, supra note 1, at 9 (describing Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 121 S. Ct. 1281
(2000); Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964); and United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012)).
11. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 417 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring)
(questioning the third-party doctrine's application in the "digital age"); Stephen E. Henderson, After
United States v. Jones, After the Fourth Amendment Third Party Doctrine, 14 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 431,
435 (2013); Katherine J. Strandburg, Home, Home on the Web and Other Fourth Amendment
Implications of Technosocial Change, 70 MD. L. REV. 614, 649 (2011); Matthew Tokson, Automation
and the Fourth Amendment, 96 IOWA L. REV. 581 (2011); Jed Rubenfeld, The End ofPrivacy, 61 STAN.
L. REV. 101 (2008).
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growing power of digital firms, and their control over a wealth of sensitive
user data, prompted a profusion of scholarship critiquing the third-party
doctrine as out-of-date and out-of-touch.
Concern about the third-party doctrine only grew as the business
models of digital firms became more complex, more deeply embedded in
daily life, and more intrusive.12 In the modern age, companies' "business
records" can comprise a detailed and encyclopedic dossier reflecting one's
medical history, religious affiliation, political views, and intimate
partnerships. Although this data is highly revelatory and its collection
nearly ubiquitous, positive law has failed to comprehensively define, let
alone address, intrusive practices in the private sector.13
In cases considering how the third-party doctrine applies to technology
companies, courts have been reluctant to critique these business practices
head-on. The Fourth Amendment is not an information privacy statute, and
it clearly does not restrict the ways in which the private sector uses or
gathers information.14  Instead, as the appellate decisions on cell-site
location tracking make plain, the fact that the records at issue were created
and maintained for "legitimate business purposes" essentially disposed of
the constitutional issue.15
The appellate decisions on cell-site location tracking that preceded
Carpenter eflect this approach, uniformly holding that individuals lacked
any expectation of privacy in their cell-site location information.16 These
12. See Jack M. Balkin, Essay, Free Speech in the Algorithmic Society: Big Data, Private
Governance, and New School Speech Regulation, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1149, 1169 (2017)
("[C]onsumer objects - including appliances, cars, and houses - collect information about you, listen to
everything you are doing, and then report back to the corporation that manufactures and services them.");
see also Natalie Ram et al., Genealogy Databases and the Future of Criminal Investigation, 360
SCIENCE 1078 (2018) (describing why, pursuant to the third party doctrine, the Fourth Amendment does
not require a warrant for police to acquire genetic testing or matching information from direct-to-
consumer databases).
13. See generally Paul Ohm, Sensitive Information, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 1125 (2014); Anupam
Chander, Margot E. Kaminski & William McGeveran, Catalyzing Privacy Law (U. of Colorado Law
Legal Studies Research Paper No. 19-25 August 7, 2019), https://ssm.com/abstract-3433922
[https://perma.cc/662K-WVMB].
14. See Kiel Brennan-Marquez, Outsourced Law Enforcement, 18 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 797, 797-
98 (2016) (explaining that the Fourth Amendment does not apply to private searches conducted "without
prodding, to assist the authorities").
15. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. at 744 (1979); see also United States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880,
887 (6th Cir. 2016) ("[T]he cell-site data-like mailing addresses, phone numbers, and IP addresses-
are information that facilitate personal communications, rather than part of the content of those
communications themselves."); In re United States for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600, 612 (5th
Cir. 2013) ("[T]hese are the providers' own records of transactions to which it is a party."); see also
United States v. Davis, 754 F.3d 1205, 1217 (11th Cir. 2014) (reasoning that cell phone users did not
"voluntarily" disclose their cell-site location information), rev'd en banc, 785 F.3d 498, 511 (May 5,
2015) ("Davis can assert neither ownership nor possession of the third-party's business records he
sought to suppress.").
16. See, e.g., United States v. Graham, 824 F.3d 421, 430 (4th Cir. 2016) (en bane) ("As most cell
phone users know all too well, proximity to a cell tower is necessary to complete these tasks."); In re
United States for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d at 613 ("A cell service subscriber, like a telephone
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decisions frequently invoked ideas about what members of society actually
knew about the technology and business practices of cell phone service
providers, asserting that cell phone users "know," "understand," or "are
aware" that cell towers collect location information. These inquiries and
assumptions about cell phone users' general understanding and knowledge
are integral to Fourth Amendment doctrine, even if they appear unfounded
on empirical evidence about consumer knowledge.17 As Professor Tokson
has previously written, knowledge plays a "central role" in Fourth
Amendment doctrine.'8 If an individual "knowingly exposes" information
to the public, she cannot have an expectation of privacy in that information;
the government's acquisition or use of it is not a Fourth Amendment
search. 19
When courts determine whether an expectation of privacy is
"reasonable," and thus whether a search occurred, they frequently look to
what Professor Tokson has called "societal" or "collective knowledge."20
But the approach propounded by the appellate courts is particularly notable
because it emphasized not the general interests or knowledge of "society"
at large, but rather those of cell phone users and subscribers.2 1 As the Fifth
Circuit described it in 2013,
"[b]ecause a cell phone user makes a choice to get a phone, to select
a particular service provider, and to make a call, and because he
knows that the call conveys cell site information, the provider
retains this information, and the provider will turn it over to the
police if they have a court order, he voluntarily conveys his cell site
data each time he makes a call."22
Thus, what a firm chooses to do, as a business matter, would
constrain the constitutional rights of its customers. The problem with this
traditional approach is that it is blind to actual inequalities in law, politics,
and the market.23 The obvious imbalance of power between the cell service
user, understands that his cell phone must send a signal to a nearby cell tower in order to wirelessly
connect his call."); United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498 (11th Cir. 2015) (en banc).
17. Christopher Slobogin & Joseph E. Schumacher, Reasonable Expectations of Privacy and
Autonomy in Fourth Amendment Cases: An Empirical Look at "Understandings Recognized and
Permitted by Society ", 42 DUKE L.J. 727, 743 (1993) ("[T]he Supreme Court has frequently refused to
consider empirical information, or has given it short shrift."); Tokson, supra note 3, at 177 ("[T]he
majority of cell phone users do not know that their cell phone provider collects their location data, and
roughly 15% of users affirmatively believe that their data is not collected.").
18. Tokson, supra note 3, at 141.
19. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351-52 (1967).
20. Tokson, supra note 3, at 151-52.
21. See also Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2229 (2018) (Kennedy, J., dissenting)
(emphasizing that cell phone customers lack "any meaningful interest" in and "any practical control"
over location records).
22. In re United States for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600, 614 (5th Cir. 2015).
23. See K. Sabeel Rahman, Domination, Democracy, and Constitutional Political Economy in the
New GildedAge. Towards a Fourth Wave ofLegal Realism?, 94 TEX. L. REv. 1329, 1335 (2016) ("The
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provider and the consumer-an imbalance that anybody who has tried to
negotiate a cell phone contract would recognize-was irrelevant.24 This
imbalance is not limited to retail interactions between consumers and
providers; as Frank Pasquale has pointed out, big tech companies can lobby
far more effectively than their competitors, and certainly enjoy higher status
in the U.S. Congress than criminal defendants.25 In short, this approach
essentially deferred to the power of private enterprise, recognizing that the
business and technological realities of how a service is structured can
dramatically affect privacy and allowing those realities to, in turn, empower
the government as well.26
The majority opinion in Carpenter steered in a different direction,
emphasizing not the interests of individuals as cell phone subscribers, but
rather the interests of society as a whole. The opinion opened with a
reminder of the decision's importance to the general public, pointing out
that the number of active cell phone service accounts in the United States
exceeds the nation's population.27  Rather than looking to the "terms of
[Carpenter's] contracts"28 with his cell service providers in order to
determine whether Mr. Carpenter had a reasonable expectation of privacy
in his location records, the Court recast the inquiry into social expectations
more broadly. The opinion suggested that American society had a
reasonable expectation that law enforcement could not-and would not-
problem with this approach to constitutionalism is that what looks on the surface like the fairness and
equality of market ordering in effect overlooks, and thus perpetuates, underlying disparities in power,
capacity, and opportunity that shape these transactions.").
24. See Scott Skinner-Thompson, Reclaiming the Right to Future Tense, L. & POL. ECON. BLOG
(Sept. 4, 2019), https://lpeblog.org/2019/09/04/reclaiming-the-right-to-future-tense/
[https://perma.cc/Z59Y-9MBZ] ("Lengthy and unreadable adhesion contracts that force us to surrender
any remaining claim to privacy . .. tak[e] advantage of the limited resources we have to consume much
less contest these terms-of-service.").
25. FRANK PASQUALE, BLACK Box SOCIETY 311 (2016).
26. See, e.g., WOODROW HARTZOG, PRIVACY'S BLUEPRINT: THE BATTLE TO CONTROL THE
DESIGN OF NEW TECHNOLOGIES 51 (2018) ("Because design can allocate power to people and
industries, it is inherently political .... To not address design is to sanction the power of creators to
determine the context in which people make decisions."); SHOSHANA ZUBOFF, THE AGE OF
SURVEILLANCE CAPITALISM: THE FIGHT FOR A HUMAN FUTURE AT THE NEW FRONTIER OF POWER 480-
81 (2019) (asserting that U.S. scholars focus on "Fourth Amendment doctrine as it circumscribes the
relationship between individuals and the state . .. [t]he problem is that even expanded protections from
the state do not shield us from the assault on sanctuary wrought by instrumentarian power and animated
by surveillance capitalism's economic imperatives"); cf ELIZABETH ANDERSON, PRIVATE
GOVERNMENT: How EMPLOYERS RULE OUR LIVES (AND WHY WE DON'T TALK ABOUT IT) 40 (2017)
(describing most modem workplaces as "communist dictatorships" and asking, "Should we not subject
these forms of government o at least as much critical scrutiny as we pay to the democratic state?").
27. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2211 (2018) ("There are 396 million cell phone
service accounts in the United States-for a Nation of 326 million people.").
28. Id. at 2235 (Alito, J., dissenting).
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"secretly monitor and catalogue every single movement" an individual
made, regardless of what the market might support.29
By repeatedly highlighting the rights of the general public-rather
than the interests and understandings of the public as cell phone
subscribers-Carpenter foregrounded the important political and social
interests implicated by digital surveillance.30  Concern about the
government's "near perfect surveillance" capabilities, the Court reasoned,
rendered the location-tracking in Carpenter different from the
government's acquisition of ordinary third-party records.31 The constant
acquisition of cell-site location information from 400 million mobile
devices in the United States made it possible for law enforcement o "travel
back in time" to investigate any suspect.32 In the language of technology,
the business model of cell service providers made it possible to investigate
"at scale."33 And the falling costs of cell phone location surveillance, which
"is remarkably easy, cheap, and efficient compared to traditional
investigative tools[,]" only aggravated the Court's concerns that it was not
just Mr. Carpenter's privacy that was implicated in Carpenter, "but also
everyone else's."34
While the Court readily admits in Carpenter that digital surveillance
has become cheap and easy, precisely because it is enabled and empowered
by the private sector, it fails to fully acknowledge the degree to which
private sector and government surveillance are entwined and enmeshed.
Put another way, the Court's laissez-faire attitude toward private sector data
collection has created a rich source of information for law enforcement, yet
goes hand in hand with stringent limitations on government conduct.36 Of
course, as the Fourth Amendment does not apply to the private sector, this
29. Id. at 2217; see also Orin S. Kerr, Implementing Carpenter, 7 (U.S.C. Law Legal Studies Paper
No. 18-29 Dec. 14, 2018), https:/ssrn.com/abstract-3301257 [https://perma.cc/BVJ2-RZW7]
("Carpenter asks a different question: Has technology changed expectations of what the police can
do?").
30. See, e.g., Katherine Strandburg, Freedom of Association in a Networked World: First
Amendment Regulation of Relational Surveillance, 49 B.C. L. REV. 741, 744 (2008); Neil Richards,
Intellectual Privacy, 87 TEX. L. REV. 387, 388-89 (2008).
31. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2218.
32. Id.
33. Cf Julie E. Cohen, Scaling Trust and Other Fictions, L. & POL. ECON. BLOG (May 29, 2019),
https://lpeblog.org/2019/05/29/scaling-trust-and-other-fictions/#more-2442 [https://perma.cc/4U95-
RY6G] (highlighting the challenge of "governing data-driven algorithmic processes that operate in real
time, immanently, automatically, and at scale").
34. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2218-19.
35. See id.
36. See id at 2217, 2219. In this way, the Court's approach-preserving individual liberty and
"choice" in the area of privacy, while "in disregard of the legally constituted structural setting in which
these choices take place"-runs parallel to its approach in other areas of constitutional law. See




line makes sense.37 But the Court appears blind to the unique affordances
that digital technology, and the profusion of private-sector data collection
in particular, provide to law enforcement and government agencies.38
2. KNOWLEDGE IS POWER
Digital surveillance has proven to be both cheap and easy in more
than one sense. Carpenter also expressed unease about the secrecy and
surreptitious nature of warrantless digital surveillance.3 9 Secrecy threatens
to undermine the effectiveness of checks on law enforcement because the
public lacks any real opportunity to mobilize against abusive practices. The
Carpenter Court noted that the cost and physical limitations that had
previously constrained law enforcement's ability to conduct long-term
surveillance were falling by the wayside as digital technology evolved.40
As Justice Sotomayor had noted in her Jones concurrence, digital tracking
compounds these concerns because its surreptitious nature also lowers the
costs of surveillance by avoiding public engagement, scandal, and
backlash-interests that the private sector also largely shares.4 1
Not only is compelled disclosure low-cost in a financial sense-
because it piggybacks on existing business practices by compelling the
disclosure of information that would exist anyway42 -- but because it
proceeds in secret, and avoids the kind of "community hostility" that has
traditionally served as a check on law enforcement.43 The classic view, as
the Fifth Circuit had put it in 2013, was that the remedy for overbroad
surveillance power was "in the market or the political process: in demanding
that service providers do away with such records (or anonymize them) or in
lobbying elected representatives to enact statutory protections."44  But
compelled disclosure of business records occurs behind closed doors, and
resists the longstanding view that the "political process" will constrain law
enforcement when it overreaches.
Blind faith in the political process also ignores the ways in which our
institutions have been designed, or are in fact operating, to shield critical
37. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2213.
38. Id. at 2220.
39. Id. at 2217-18; see United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 415-16 (2012) (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring).
40. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217-18 ("[C]ell phone tracking is remarkably easy, cheap, and
efficient. . , .").
41. Jones, 565 U.S. at 415-16 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). But see Alan Z. Rozenshtein,
Surveillance Intermediaries, 70 STAN. L. REv. 99, 99 (2018) (arguing that the private sector constrains
government surveillance through litigiousness, proceduralism, and policy mobilization).
42. See generally ZUBOFF, supra note 26.
43. Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 424-25 (2004); Jones, 565 U.S. at 415-16 (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring).
44. In re United States for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600, 615 (2013).
2020] 29
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information about compelled disclosure from the public. The disparities
between compelled disclosure and search warrant practice in federal courts
illustrate how key documents about digital surveillance are systematically
kept out of the public eye. The Stored Communications Act does not require
that law enforcement notify the target of an electronic search warrant.45 in
other words, the decision of whether the target will be notified rests entirely
with the communications service providers.46  But service providers are
often bound by court orders commanding them not to notify the target of a
search.47 And local rules often presumptively embed secrecy into their
frameworks and procedures for docketing electronic surveillance
materials.48  In contrast, while applications and orders for "compelled
disclosure" have long been cloaked in secrecy, search warrants have
historically been public.49 In federal court, applications for search warrants
are filed with the court clerk and routinely unsealed after a search has been
executed.50 The rules governing physical searches require that the target of
a search warrant must be given notice of a search.51
The result is that, as Carpenter suggested, the "compelled
disclosure" framework is far less transparent than physical searches. In
recent months, several litigants have sought to change that. In a current case
pending before the D.C. Circuit, the Reporters Committee for Freedom of
the Press ("RCFP") and journalist Jason Leopold are seeking to unseal key
documents-including docket numbers, applications for surveillance, and
court orders authorizing surveillance-with respect to investigations that
have already concluded.52 The Northern District of California recently
denied a similar application to unseal key information about electronic
surveillance dockets, applications, and orders, reasoning that the kind of
transparency the petitioners sought would require the investment of
"significant manpower and public resources."53 And in the Ninth Circuit,
45. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(b)(1)(A) (2019). See, e.g., In re United States, 665 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1221-
22 (D. Or. 2009) (concluding that, "when the property to be seized is in the possession of a third party,"
the Stored Communications Act and Fourth Amendment require only notice to the third party);
Memorandum from Chief Justice Lamberth (D.C. Cir.), In re Search Warrant for Email Account, 946
F. Supp. 2d 67 (D.D.C. 2013), http://images.politico.com/global/2013/05/20/lamberthrosen.html
[https://perma.cc/R62J-FL5J].
46. See, e.g., Office of Legal Education, Searching and Seizing Computers and Obtaining
Electronic Evidence in Criminal Investigations 133 (2009), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/
criminal-ccips/legacy/2015/01/14/ssmanual2009.pdf [https://perma.ccIB2MC-VWZG].
47. See 18 U.S.C. § 2705(b) (2019) (setting out requirements for separate nondisclosure order).
48. Hannah Bloch-Wehba, Exposing Secret Searches: A First Amendment Right of Access to
Electronic Surveillance Orders, 93 WASH. L. REV. 145, 162-64 (2018).
49. Id.
50. See id. at 168-69 (discussing First Amendment right of access to search warrant materials).
51. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41; see also Jonathan Witmer-Rich, The Rapid Rise of Delayed Notice
Searches, and the Fourth Amendment "Rule Requiring Notice", 41 PEPP. L. REV. 509, 571 (2014).
52. Leopold v. United States, No. 18-5276 (D.C. Cir. argued Sept. 17, 2019).
53. In re Granick, 388 F. Supp. 3d 1107, 1120-21 (2019).
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the American Civil Liberties Union and the Electronic Frontier Foundation
are seeking access to a judicial opinion that reportedly concerns the
Department of Justice's effort to hold Facebook in contempt of court after
it refused to provide technical assistance in wiretapping its Messenger
service.54 In that case, although the dispute has been widely reported, not
even the docket number is known to the public.55
At first glance, concerns about secrecy appear to be no more than a
minor theme in Carpenter. But the disparities between digital and physical
search warrant practice only underscore the importance of the Carpenter
Court's effort to adopt a common, privacy-oriented approach to defining a
"search."56 Against this background, the Court's imposition of the warrant
requirement does more to vindicate public values than it might initially
appear. By rejecting the notion that the warrant requirement "simply does
not apply when the Government acquires records using compulsory
process,"57 the Court also called into question the longstanding formal
distinction between the procedural requirements of "compelled disclosure"
and those of a "traditional search," opening additional avenues for
democratic oversight.
The Court's re-envisioning of the line between "compelled
disclosure" and a "traditional search" thus not only elevates the substantive
standard for digital surveillance, but also has the potential to promote new
forms of transparency for law enforcement, and to align practice for digital
and physical searches. Yet, these changes have proven to be slow. Consider
the case brought by the RCFP and Jason Leopold, which aptly illustrates
how some courts have remained convinced, even after Carpenter, that
compelled disclosure is qualitatively different than "traditional searches."
The district court reasoned that digital search warrants are "functionally
unlike" their physical counterparts, because of differences in the method of
execution, and the potential for a recipient to move to quash before a search
is executed.59  The opinion also inaptly describes the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act as a "statutory framework that broadly
54. EFF, ACLU v. DOJ - Facebook Messenger unsealing, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND.,
https://www.eff.org/cases/eff-aclu-v-doj-facebook-messenger-unsealing [https://perma.cc/MGX7-
V8VU] (last visited Dec. 1, 2019).
55. Id
56. See Tokson, supra note 1 at 5-6 (describing how the Court's "focus on the privacy harms
caused by pervasive digital surveillance suggests that it is these harms, rather than the extent of consumer
disclosure to third parties, that will primarily determine the scope of the Fourth Amendment going
forward").
57. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2221 (2018).
58. In re Leopold, 300 F. Supp. 3d 61, 88 (D.D.C. 2018).
59. See In re Leopold, 300 F. Supp. 3d at 88-89.
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prioritizes law enforcement's need for secrecy over the public's interest in
transparency."60
If anything about Carpenter is clear, it is the Court's rejection of the
notion that "digital is different," that digital searches are by definition less
intrusive (or more consensual) than physical ones, or that as a categorical
matter, a separate set of rules ought to apply to compelled disclosure. Yet,
the RCFP case helps to explain why Carpenter alone will not discipline
digital searches to public opinion. Widespread secrecy prevents judges
from understanding new technologies of surveillance, impedes lawmakers
from acting on new privacy threats, and keeps social movements from
coalescing and advocating for change. Despite Carpenter's "blockbuster"
victory for privacy, democratic institutions remain ill-equipped to monitor,
scrutinize, and oversee demands for compelled disclosure or digital
searches more generally.
III. CONCLUSION
I agree with Professor Tokson that Carpenter's hift away from the
formulaic inquiry into whether an individual has formally or voluntarily
yielded a privacy interest is cause for celebration. I also agree that
Carpenter's emphasis on privacy should suggest hat the use of pole cams,
and compelled disclosure of web histories and smart home data are
"searches" in the constitutional sense.
But as technology companies continue to routinely gather,
repackage, and sell information to law enforcement, the appetite for third-
party surveillance will continue to grow. Consider one example from last
year, when Forbes reported that the FBI had obtained a "reverse search
warrant" compelling Google to disclose "all users of its services who'd been
within the vicinity" of several robberies in Portland, Maine.61 The story
was particularly concerning in light of an Associated Press report that
Google continued to track users' location even after they had turned tracking
off.62
On one level, the Google case illustrates how Carpenter's logic has
been applied in new settings-the FBI did, after all, obtain a search warrant
to compel disclosure of the information. But on a deeper level, the case also
illustrates the continuing dependency of law enforcement on the wealth of
60. Id. at 87.
61. Thomas Brewster, To Catch A Robber, The FBI Attempted An Unprecedented Grab For
Google Location Data, FORBES (Aug. 15, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbrewster/2018/0
8/15/to-catch-a-robber-the-fbi-attempted-an-unprecendeted-grab-for-google-location-
data/#24fc80e3741d [https://perma.ccN6FN-VL5J].
62. Ryan Nakashima, Google Tracks Your Movements, Like it or Not, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Aug.
13, 2018), https://apnews.com/828aefab64d441 lbac257a07claffecb [https://perma.cc/RJ5H-YCRA].
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information generated and held by private enterprise. As Carpenter
suggested, warrantless surveillance threatens to become undemocratic when
law enforcement operates "at scale" and behind closed doors.
Yet, Carpenter does little to address law enforcement's appetite for
this information, an issue that will certainly remain problematic in the years
to come. The warrant requirement seems like quaint protection against a
surveillance economy that presents law enforcement with an all-you-can-
eat buffet of particularly detailed information. In this context, legislative
constraints, democratic oversight, and transparency will prove particularly
essential for a proportionate response to warrantless surveillance at scale.
